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[Abstract] The paper analyzes the convergence process of industrial productivity across 
Russian regions during the period 1996-2004 by applying empirical methods. The indus-
trial sector refers to, in accordance with Russian official statistics, oil & gas extraction, 
electricity production, mining & quarrying and manufacturing. Convergence in productiv-
ity levels is well analyzed in economic literature, but few have tested the hypothesis on 
Russian regions. Most previous convergence analysis of Russian regions has examined 
the development in income per capita. Russia’s special history and vast geographical ex-
tent have led to huge regional variations in resource endowments, market access and indus-
trial structure, to name a few. Since the regression results are highly sensitive for region-
specific factors, these are identified and controlled for in the analysis. In addition, panel 
data techniques are used to check the robustness of the results to region-specific charac-
teristics, which are not always measurable. The analysis also tests whether there is a ten-
dency to economic agglomeration in the data. The hypothesis of absolute convergence is 
not supported in the analysis, but when region-specific factors are controlled for there are 
signs of convergence among Russian regions.Trade and investment as a share of regional 
industrial production appear in the analysis as the most significant explanatory variables.
Linda Skjold Oksnes 
Regional Development 
of Russian Industry
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1. Introduction 
Industrial production in Russia has undergone major structural changes. The break-up of the 
Soviet Union brought an end to the command-and-control based economic system, and the 
Russian economy started to transform into a market-based system. It is reasonable to expect 
that the dismantling of the command lines and the introduction of market incentives have 
affected the industrial composition, the geographical structure and the distribution of 
industrial productivity, the question is how.  
 
The first years of the transition were marred with problems; rapid inflation and a rent seeking 
and fraudulent economic behaviour led to falling investments and production. When the old 
command and supply lines were dissolved, trust and experience had to be established with the 
new market-based system. In the second half of the 90s inflation was brought under control 
and the economy started reacting to market incentives.  
 
Using regional data from Rosstat for the period 1996 to 2004 I will analyse how the regional 
distribution of productivity in Russia has developed under the conditions of a market 
economy and how the observed pattern resonates with economic theory. Have investments 
and technology flowed into the least capital-intensive and less technologically advanced 
regions, so that the initially less-productive regions have caught up with the relatively more 
productive ones - or will we find a tendency for economic agglomeration and yet more 
diverging productivity rates? To answer my questions I have applied an empirical method, 
testing for absolute and conditional convergence. I have identified a set of explanatory 
variables considered of importance for regional productivity performance. Among these are 
investments, population growth, foreign trade and investments, indicators on the climate for 
technological development and business creation, market potential and initial industrial 
structure. Since the regression results could be sensitive to regional specific effects, which are 
not always measurable, I have applied panel data techniques, in addition to the cross-sectional 
analysis widely used in the literature, to control for these effects.  
 
  As a measure of productivity I will use labour productivity, defined as value added per 
worker employed in industry. The focus will be on what has been traditionally regarded as the 
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main Russian industries: oil and gas extraction, electricity production, mining and quarrying, 
together with manufacturing. I will later refer to this sector simply as the ‘industry sector’.  
 
Russia’s large and highly industrialized economy and huge geographical area makes it unique 
examining regional convergence process. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (Ch. 11, 2004) argue that 
we are more likely to find support for the hypothesis of absolute convergence across regions 
than across countries, because, although differences in technology, preferences and 
institutions exist across regions, these differences are likely to be smaller than across 
countries. In the case of Russia, geography and initial industrial structure, including the 
country’s large resource industry, and substantial differences in the regions’ resource 
endowments may obstruct the results of convergence. The majority of the Russian regions are 
highly industrialized in specialized manner: many regions have concentrations of just one or 
two sectors.  
 
There exist few analyses of convergence applied to data for the industrial sector in Russia. 
Studies on regional convergence in GRP (gross regional output) tend to support the 
hypothesis of conditional convergence; when regional specific factors are controlled for the 
general findings are convergence (Solanko 2003, Merkina 2004, Maurseth 2006, and Nielsen 
2005). However, the results are not unequivocal (see for example Maurseth 2003). Ledyaeva 
and Linden (2008) find, applying panel data techniques to the Russian GRP for the period 
1996-2004, support for the hypothesis of conditional convergence. It is an interesting study 
whether the industrial sectors has adjusted differently than the rest of the economy and differ 
from regional income levels with respect to convergence. 
 
Analysis of convergence in productivity has stressed the importance of industrial structure 
and regional industrial structure is commonly used as control variables in analysing 
convergence among regions within a country (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991 
or Ahrend 2002 and 2008 for the case of Russia). Before the financial crisis initial conditions, 
such as regional industrial structure, endowments of resources and human capital and 
geographical locations have proven to explain a significant share of inter-regional income 
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disparities in Russia (see Ahrend (2002) and (2008)). Especially resource orientated regions 
seem to do better in terms of economic growth (Dolinskaya (2002) and (Popov (2001)). 
Empirical findings suggest that a large share of extractive industries in industrial production1 
has positive effects on regional growth, also after the financial crisis (see Ahrend (2008), 
Maurseth (2005), Nielsen (2005) and Solanko (2003)). Ledyaeva and Linden (2008) on the 
other hand find no such positive effects.  
 
In conformity with the empirical convergence literature I find support for the hypothesis of 
conditional, but not absolute convergence in my data. Regional openness for trade and 
investment prove to be most important explaining the observed regional differences in 
productivity growth rates. Industrial structure proves insignificant, only the variable 
indicating resource intensive industries has some explanatory power. There are no signs of 
economic agglomeration in that regions showing largest growth in productivity are clustered, 
they are rather scattered around the country.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a brief economic and political 
background, section 3 explains the theoretical framework that underlies the empirical 
analysis, in section 4 I present a description of the Russian regions with respect to the core 
economic variables in the analysis, whereas section 5 offers the empirical analysis and 
regression results. 
 
 
 
                                              
1 Most energy and fuel, as well as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy sectors are included in extractive industries 
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2.  Political and economic background 
The political and economic background can possible shed some light on the regional 
economic performance during the transition. I will in this section briefly go through some of 
what I claim is important in understanding the regional development of productivity in 
Russian industry: reform politics and the special features of Russia’s regional industrial 
structure. 
2.1 Regional politics – fragmentation and integration 
Soviet economy was based on the principles and mechanism of a command-and-control 
system: main economic decisions regarding resource allocation, what and how much to 
produce and where to produce these goods were taken by the central government. Under the 
planned economy, the regional economy was basically a constituent part of the national 
economy. The local governments had limited economic power, whereby the large enterprises 
where managed directly from Moscow (Lavigne 1995). Soviet planning was performed on a 
sectoral basis rather than on regional. Production, consumption, trade and investments were 
determined not by regional demand, but by state plan and the policies of federal departments. 
The centre exercised strict control over regional income flows (Granberg 2000).  
 
Legal and economic fragmentation of the Russian Federation arose after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Dispersion of the systems for economic interaction together with a weak centre 
led to regional separatism. The relations between the federal centre and the regions became 
rather ad-hoc based. Under these conditions, the regions lobbied for greater autonomy and 
bargained for favourable fiscal arrangements. Many regional leaders took advantage of the 
weak federal centre under Yeltsin to size powers and control over regional resources. Many 
regions started passing and enforcing regional laws, many of them inconsistent with federal 
legislation. The struggle for power has also led to an inward focus, and building up new trade 
lines was not a high priority. Inter-regional trade as a part of GNP fell from 22% to 
approximately 12–13% in the period 1990 to 2000 (Granberg 2000). By the end of Yeltsin’s 
period many regional leaders were running their federal subjects as personal fiefdoms.  
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On January 1992 the implementation of transition policies started with a large scale 
privatization and price liberalization program. Most of the prices were liberalized during the 
first year and by the beginning of 1997 much of the privatization process had been 
accomplished with private enterprises accounting for a large part of industrial output in 
general, but large regional differences existed. The regional leadership had different attitudes 
towards liberalization and privatization reform. Some regions refrained from privatizing their 
industries and refused to implement legislation concerning privatization of land. Large 
enterprises could put pressure on the local government to gain private benefit, often referred 
to as ’state capture’. Firms could for example push for perpetuation of the property-rights 
regime to restrict new entry into their markets, preserves their opportunities to arbitrage 
between reformed and unreformed parts of the regional economy, and protects themselves 
from regulatory interference by the central government (Desai et. al, 2001).  
 
Putin’s primary object has been to tighten federal control of the regions and create a unified 
economic and legal space. Putin’s efforts to bring regional legislation in line with the 1993 
Constitution and federal statues have shown results. In 2000, a comprehensive reform of 
inter-governmental fiscal relations was initiated, making the federal transfer allocations to the 
regions more transparent. Indeed, the new formula-based methodology for determining the 
transfer allocations has made the transfers more predictable and helped concentrate federal 
recourses in the poorest regions (Desai et. al. 2001). The work of simplifying the bureaucracy 
and the tax system has helped to strengthen the centre/ periphery relationship. Today’s Russia 
has, to greater extent, become a unified legal space and an integrated national market. 
 
2.2 Industrial structure  
Economic policy under the Soviet followed the objective of self-sufficiency and creating the 
Soviet economy into one of the world industrial and military super-power. The participation 
in foreign trade was limited and concentrated among socialist countries. As a result the Soviet 
economy was producing in a range of sectors, but different sectors worked at different levels 
of competitiveness (Senik-Leygonie and Hughes 1992) – not all competitive at international 
standards. The Soviet economic system contained few incentives for economization of 
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resources and investments in innovative activity. Economic planning was often rather 
subjected to other political priorities than profitability. Governmental investments were put 
into developing the heavy and military industry. Military oriented R&D accounted for about 
75% of the federal science budget, even as late as the second half of the 80s (Saltykov 1997).  
 
As a result of the Soviet control-and-command system economic activity was concentrated in 
large production units and spread out over the country. The Soviet leaders always had 
preferences for large projects and their belief in economies of scale has proved astonishingly 
long-lived (Gros and Steinherr 1995). They had a clear strategy for spreading the production 
to new regions and small towns. Specific regions and towns were singled out as industrial 
locations. Many urban areas, especially in the North, were designed to serve the needs of a 
single giant enterprise. Extreme cases of this kind are the ‘closed’ towns servicing secret 
enterprises, facilities and research institutes (Granberg 2000).  
 
The rapid industrialization that commenced with the first Soviet Five-Year Plan, in the late 
1920s, brought with it the need for natural resources like coal, oil and heavy metals 
(Blakkisrud 2006.). This meant the start of the industrial policies for the North and Far-
Eastern regions, so richly endowed with natural resources. The eastward orientation was 
reinforced by the wartime evacuation of hundreds of factories were evacuated, to protect them 
from the Nazis. Many of them remained after the war. A military-industrial base was by then 
established in the east. 
 
Industry under transition 
During the transition industrial production was reduced by more than half, but some 
industries fared worse than others. In light of the mono-industrial pattern across regions, the 
transition had varying regional consequences. Those regions that inherited the ‘wrong’ 
industries experienced huge losses. Especially hard hit was the manufacturing industry, 
together with mechanical engineering, chemical and forest industries. Important factors here 
were falling national demand, loss of international competitive ability and cutbacks in state 
subsidies. Faced with increased competition, especially when the CIS-countries opened 
towards the West, Russian industry faced competition problems. According to OECD (1995) 
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calculations, the disruption of the trade with CIS-countries contributed to 10% of Russia’s 
economic decline in the early 1990s. 
 
Granberg (2000) has identified three especially vulnerable types of regions: those with a high 
concentration of manufacturing industry, peripheral regions, and those dependent on federal 
transfers. Among the latter, regions based on military industry found themselves in a 
particularly difficult situation during the transition. Northern peripheral regions without large 
reserves of natural resources were hit especially hard. The industrialization of this area had 
been to some extent policy-dictated and did not reflect real economic costs. Transportation 
costs rose sharply during the transition, and many Northern enterprises started running at 
huge losses. The winners were the regions endowed with oil, gas, non-ferrous metals and 
diamonds, and nodal centres. (See Blakkisrud 2006.) 
 
Since 1998 the pace of structural change has slowed down, while intra-sectoral change has 
become an increasingly important source of productivity growth. The devaluation of the 
rouble increased the international competitiveness of the Russian industry, especially 
manufacturing industry, which began to catch-up. Although many firms increased production 
by utilizing existing input, those firms that managed to actively restructure also increased 
their employment. Especially after 2002, the easy gains from the devaluation became 
exhausted and the firms that had increased productivity managed to do so through active 
restructuring (Ahrend 2004). 
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3. Theoretical conciderations 
How will the regional distribution of productivity rates develop when the economy is 
transformed from a command-and-control and into a market economy? According to 
economic theory, with the opening up for market forces, investments will flow into regions 
with the largest growth potential, and firms will adopt technologies that serve to maximize 
profit. In a command-and-control economy no such self-regulating mechanism exists, while it 
depends on the central authorities preferences and whether their ability to enhance 
profitability. Opening up for market forces is expected to lead to convergence for two 
reasons: decreasing marginal factor productivity, and the transfer of technology from regions 
at the productivity (technology) frontier to relatively less productive regions, which have 
greater potential to improve their productivity through investing in technology. In the absence 
of one or both of these assumptions, economic agglomeration and divergence may emerge.  
3.1 Neoclassical theory – decreasing return to capital 
The hypothesis of convergence originates from neoclassical growth models in the tradition of 
Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). The models aim to explain growth 
dynamics in a period of transition, while long-term growth rates are taken as given. Since the 
Solow-model assumes full employment, output per capita is equivalent to production per 
employed labour (or value added per worker), my indicator on labour productivity. The 
central mechanism is decreasing return to capital. Diverging growth rates in productivity are 
explained by differences in the regional possibilities to grow through investing in increased 
capital/labour ratio, which depends on how far the regions are from their steady-state level of 
productivity. Thus further away a region is from its steady-state productivity level, given by 
the regions initial characteristics, thus higher the growth in productivity. Ceteris paribus, 
because of decreasing return to capital regions with a lower capital/labour ration are expected 
to grow faster than other regions. In steady-state the prospects for growth through increased 
capital/labour ratio is exhausted and the only source of productivity growth is through 
technological development. Assuming that technology is a public good, all regions will have 
access to the same type of technology, and thereby grow at the same long-term growth rate in 
steady-state.  
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Any differences in steady-states in the original Solow-model are due to differences in the 
consumers’ time preferences, which determine the saving rate, growth in the workforce or the 
rate of depreciation2. The Solow-model assumes a perfectly competitive world:  all markets 
are in equilibrium, such that the saving rate equals the gross investment rate3 in a closed 
economy. Assuming that regions forms separate economic units, opening up for factor 
mobility will repeal the restrictions the local saving rate put on the rate of investments. 
Capital and labour will flow into the regions, which offer highest marginal returns. Relative 
capital scarce regions will grow relatively faster, because of capital inflow. 
 
The model, as I have described it, predicts higher rate of convergence than those observed 
empirically. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) show that when human capital is included in 
the closed version of the model, so that diminishing return set in more slowly, the model 
accords better with empirical evidence on convergence. Later Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) show that also an open-economy version of this model conforms with the 
empirical evidence on convergence, if an economy only can borrow to finance a portion of its 
capital needs.  
 
3.2 New growth theory – technological diffusion 
More recently, inspired by endogenous growth theory, convergence has been applied to the 
hypothesis of technological catch-up. In technology-gap theory technological diffusion and 
the regions’ ability to adopt available technologies play a key role in whether laggard regions 
tend to catch up or not. The ‘catch-up’ argument, developed by Gerschenkron (1962), 
Abramovitz (1986) and others, emphasizes the distance to the technology frontier for the 
scope of imitation of exciting technology. Relatively less technological advanced countries 
behind the innovation frontier, it is argued, can grow faster by coping technologies already 
                                              
2 The saving rate is exogenous in the Solow model. Cass (1965) and Koopman (1965) have endogenized the saving 
behaviour, but the main results remain. 
3 By gross investment I mean all fresh investment provided, including those, which covers capital depreciation.  
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developed in technologically more advanced countries (Fagerberg 1995). At the other hand if 
the technology gap becomes to large the lagging regions may not have the prerequisite to take 
advantage of the excising pool of technologies and find them self trapped in equilibrium with 
low economic development.  
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) formalize this argument in a model where the relative cost 
advantage to be gained from imitating desirable technology serves as a mechanism for 
convergence. Based on the framework for technological progress of Romer (1990), they 
describe the transitory dynamics. In this model, productivity growth is a result of an increase 
in the variety of new intermediate products4 available for the final goods sector.  
 
Access to new products can come through own innovation effort or through trade with other 
regions, which have invented new products (imitation). Imitation, as used here, is a way to 
achieve technological development, not by innovating self, but rather adopt new technologies 
developed in other regions. The cost advantage in ‘imitating’ makes it possible for the laggard 
regions to adopt new technologies at a faster rate and thereby grow faster than the frontier 
regions, required that they are able to raise sufficient funds for investments. For regions at the 
technological frontier ‘imitations’ is no feasible strategy, when there are simply no products 
to imitate.  The prospects for faster growth through ‘imitation’ are only temporary, while the 
cost of ‘imitating’ is assumed to increase when the regions are approaching the technological 
level at the frontier.  
 
In steady-state the regions are growing at the same rate, equal the rate innovation in the 
technological frontier region. The regions steady-states level of productivity is given by the 
regional market size and political and institutional factors. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
give governmental policies securing infrastructure services, an efficient tax system, the degree 
of maintenance of property rights and rule of law as examples of such. The lagging regions 
tend to be technological inferior and have lower steady-states, but the model opens for a shift 
in frontier regions. If initial technological inferior regions, turns out to be intrinsically 
                                              
4 Growth through increased variety of new products is based on the product variety theory of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
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technological superior in term of underlying parameters, then the lagging region eventually 
will eventually catch-up and pass the productivity leader.   
 
The model is similar to the neoclassical Solow model in that the driving force is decreasing 
returns (here to adopting technology), and that the countries are expected to converge to the 
same long-term growth rate. The main difference is that the process of catch-up is by no 
means automatic. If the initial productivity (technology) gap is too large, given by too low 
technological capacity or small market size, the regions are not able to generate sufficient 
investments to catch-up through imitation. Despite the relatively lower price on imitation, the 
lagging regions imitate at a lower rate than new products are invented and remain in the 
productivity backyard. 
 
3.3 Economic agglomeration 
The Barro and Sala-i-Martin model do not geographically restrict the externalities. If the 
technological spillovers/externalities are geographically restricted or tied to certain sectors, 
the result could be economic agglomeration instead. Geographical distance may act as a 
barrier – if, for example, transport costs are significantly high. Even though transport costs in 
Russia have been kept low relative to transport prices generally observed in other market 
economies, they have been rising sharply during the transition.  
Krugman (1991) presents a core-periphery model describing a source of agglomeration 
working through the size of the market, were trade or transport cost plays a crucial role5. The 
central point in this model is that agglomeration is driven by the combination of pecuniary 
externalities, economies of scale in production and the presence of trade cost. Given the 
existence of economies of scale, firms will face a trade-off between being able to make use 
off gains from being located in one market and the loss from trade costs connected with 
serving the markets, which the firm are not located. If the trade cost (eq. transport cost) is 
large relative to the economies of scale the firms will find it more profitable to be located in 
                                              
5 See also Krugman and Venables  (1990) 
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‘both’ markets. At the other hand if the trade costs are sufficient low location does not matter. 
For an intermediate level of trade costs, being located in the largest market is for a firm most 
profitable. Given one location, being in proximity to the largest market minimize trade costs. 
 
Demand and thus the size of the market are assumed to be proportional to the number of firms 
located in the market. ’Manufactures want to locate were the market is largest; the market is 
largest where the manufactures locate’ (Krugman 1991). The linkage between number of 
firms and market size could be explained by several mechanisms. In Krugman’s core-
periphery the number of firms in a market attracts additional people to that location leading to 
increased demand facing each firms in that market. In presence of trade cost people living in 
regions with relatively many firms have access to a larger variety of goods to relatively lower 
prices than the people living in the regions possessing smaller markets, which gives an 
incentive to migrate. Increased demand gives additional firms incentives to relocate to that 
location. Having a large market initially will then attract more firms to the region, which 
attract migrants and in turn additional firms. There is a circular effect in that the number of 
firms that want to locate in a certain area increases with the number of firms located there.  
  
13
4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
In 1996, output per worker was 25 times higher in the most productive region (Tyumen incl. 
Khanty-Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets) compared to the region with the second lowest output 
per worker (Dagestan republic)6. Ingush republic was recorded as being by far the least 
productive, but the observations seem unreliable: both productivity level and growth vary 
extremely from year to year. I have therefore excluded that region in the summary statistics.  
 
The highest level of labour productivity is to be found in the Urals and eastern Urals – which 
are substantially endowed with natural resources: oil, gas, metals and forests7. This area is 
shaded dark shaded on the map in Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2, which shows the geographical 
distribution of productivity levels in 1996 and 2004 respectively. The maps are divided into 
four equally large productivity intervals, with darker shading for higher productivity. The 
darkest area contains the ¼ most productive regions; the second darkest area contains the ¼ 
second most productive regions and so on.  
 
 
                                              
6 Tables with summary statistics are given in appendix A4. 
7 Following Bradshaw (2006), I define resource intensive production as production in fuel, metal and timber, woodworking 
and pulp/paper industries. 
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Figure 4.1.  Labour productivity 1996. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics.   
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Figure 4.2. Labour Productivity 2004. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
 
Regional output per worker has increased by almost 60 percentage points on average from 
1996 to 2004, but regional growth performance has differed substantially. While some regions 
can note significant productivity growth over the whole period, others have experienced 
negative growth rates: in four regions, labour productivity actually fell from 1996 to 2004. 
These were regions, which never recovered after the financial crisis. 
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Figure 4.3) shows the regional distribution of average productivity growth rates for the period 
1996 to 2004. While the map with productivity levels showed a clustering pattern in the 
resource belt, regions with the highest growth rates are scattered around the country. The 
resource-rich regions do not stand out here. Despite sharply rising oil prices from 1998, only 
some of the regions with substantial oil and gas production, like Sakhalin oblast and 
Arkhangelsk incl. Nenets, have had relatively high average growth. Tyumen incl. Khanty-
Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets shows only moderate growth performance. The two main 
financial centres, St. Petersburg and Moscow, were among the regions with relatively high 
growth rates. 
 
 
( .1472941,.6478215]
( .0766243,.1472941]
( .0432869,.0766243]
[-.0411239,.0432869]
No data
Average growth in productivity 1997-2004
 
Figure 4.3: Average regional productivity growth 1997–2004. Source Rosstat 
Regional Statistics. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
In this chapter I investigate how relative productivity levels across the regions of Russia have 
developed during the period 1996–2004. I will apply the hypothesis of absolute and 
conditional convergence in productivity and addition investigate the effect of Russian 
industrial structure8 on regional industrial productivity growth. By using indicators on 
‘market potential’9 and ‘technological spillover’ I will test for the tendency of geographical 
agglomeration, in the sense that highly productive regions are clustering together. With 
productivity I have labour productivity in mind, defined as value-added industrial production 
per employee. My focus is on what has been traditionally regarded as Russian industry – oil 
and gas extraction, electricity production, mining and quarrying, and manufacturing. I refer to 
these sectors simply as ‘industry’ or the industrial sector. 
 
5.1 The concepts of convergence  
There are two main concepts of convergence: β- and σ-convergence. If the initially less-
productive regions tend to grow faster than the more productive regions, given regional 
specific factors, we have β-convergence. If we observe decreasing disparities in productivity 
levels over time, we have σ-convergence. It can be shown that β-convergence is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for σ-convergence10. β-convergence is commonly used analyzing 
whether poorer or less productive regions are catching up with the richer and more productive 
ones. 
 
                                              
8 The industry sector used in the analysis are described in the appendix (Table A.5: Cross-regional analysis)  
9 Market potential is emphasised in Krugman’s core-periphery model and reflects the firms’ potential market (Krugman 
1991).    
10 For a derivation of the equation interested readers are advised to consult Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).  
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However if we get support for β-convergence, in the sense that less productive regions tend to 
grow faster than the more productive ones, this does not necessarily reflect convergence as 
predicted by the Solow-model or the technology-gap model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997). It could be that less-productive regions grow faster, overtaking the productive leaders, 
such that over time large differences will remain, only with a shift in the leaders. This 
phenomenon, also known as ‘leapfrogging’, has been analysed by Brezis Krugman and 
Tsiddon (1993) among others. I will analyse σ-convergence to see whether the dispersion in 
the labour productivity levels is increasing or decreasing over time, but this measure is quite 
sensitive to business cycles, when it is based on yearly deviation in productivity rates. The 
main focus will be on β-convergence: I will test for β-convergence, in order to determine 
whether there is a tendency for less productive regions to catch up with initially more 
productive regions. 
  
5.2 The model 
The empirical literature on convergence analysis has tended to use cross regional data, 
whereas a panel-data approach has become more and more common with increased data 
availability, where Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) among others have contributed to 
the work. The cross-regional approach has been criticized for inconsistency due to omitted 
variable bias and that at least some of the explanatory variables are endogenous (Caselli et al. 
1996). Omitted variables could typically be inter-regional differences in technology, politics, 
culture and climate, which are not always observable. Since I have panel data it may be 
possible to remove the region-specific effects, including non-observable events, with model 
utilizing the variation over time as well as regions. The weakness is that the time intervals for 
which the growth rates are calculated over become shorter. This leads to estimates that are 
more sensitive for cycles around the trend. Only eight years are covered in my time series, 
which yields at most two four-year periods. As that the fluctuation has been substantial over 
the years in Russia, I will base my analysis on the cross-regional approach and use the results 
from the panel analysis as robustness check. 
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Cross-regional regression  
To test for convergence I employ a linear model with regional average growth (agi) as a 
function of log initial productivity level (ln(cindi,1996)) and a set of control variables, given by 
Xi,j, were i is denoting regional observations and j the specific control variables. Equation 
(5.1) defines the model to be used in the cross-regional analysis, while equation (5.2) 
describes how I have calculated the average growth rate. 
  
(5.1)   i
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ijjii Xcindag    1996,ln           
(5.2)  


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t
tii gag  
 
  in equation (5.1) is the convergence coefficient,   is the intercept, assumed common to all 
regions, i  is the regional-specific error term, and j  represents the coefficient on the  j 
control variables ( ijX ). A negative β implies that regions with relatively initial lower 
productivity level in general have higher average growth rates over the period analyzed, so a 
negative β supports the hypothesis of convergence. The Solow model and the technology-gap 
model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) predict a negative sign on β, while Krugman’s 
(1991) core/periphery model predicts a positive sign on β.  
 
The average growth rate (eq.5.1) is calculated from the yearly growth rates (gi,t) from 1997 to 
2004. This approach is somewhat different from that of the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 
1992) regression. Barro and Sala-i-Martin use the log of the end observations, the 
observations measured in the first and last years of the period analysed. This renders the 
average growth rate sensitive to possible cycles in these two years. To make the measure of 
the productivity growth trend more robust for cycles in the end observations, I take the 
average of the yearly regional growth rate over the period analyzed. This is in general a more 
robust measure on the growth trend. On the other hand, my measure is more sensitive to the 
large regional fluctuations in growth rates in the years after the financial crisis of 1998. So by 
comparing my result with the outcome, when using ‘Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s method’ for 
calculating the growth rate, I can get an indicator of whether the results of the analysis are 
sensitive to the fluctuations in the years after the financial crisis.  
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There is no single answer as to which control variables (Xj) to include in the analysis. It all 
depends on the theory approach and characteristics of the area of interest, as well as data 
availability. Based on these considerations I have, in my analysis, chosen to include: the share 
of value added invested in the industry (investments), the share of employees with a bachelor 
degree or higher as an indicator on investment in human capital (human capital), population 
growth as an indicator on the growth in the labour stock (population), regional net migration 
(migration), total trade and foreign direct investments as a share of GRP (trade and FDI), 
reflecting regional openness for trade and foreign direct investments respectively, share of 
total employment in research and development (R&D), reflecting the regional rate of 
innovation in the industry, a technological spillover variable (spillover), an indicator on 
market potential (market potential), formation of small and medium-sized enterprises11 (SME) 
and initial industrial structure, including the share of resource intensive production in the 
regions (recourses).  
 
Variables of regional industrial structure are commonly used as control variables in analysing, 
convergence among regions within a country (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) 
or Ahrend (2002) for the case of Russia), while political and institutional differences, such as 
type of regime (often degree of democracy), rule of law and investment and business climate, 
are often assumed away when analysing convergence among national regions. Referring to 
earlier discussions, there is no doubt about that Russian regions differ in terms of 
geographical location, resource endowments and industrial structure. Especially the extractive 
industries (the resource sector) have drawn attention in empirical literature on Russian 
regional growth performance (see Popov (2001), Dolinskaya (2002), Bradshaw (2006) and 
Ahrend (2002 and 2008)). With respect to political, institutional and cultural features it could 
be argued that interregional differences among Russian regions are smaller than among 
regions across countries. On the other hand, regional policies during the 1990s were 
fragmented and largely diversified in their reform performance, although in larger extent 
subordinated federal politics after Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. In my analysis the 
SME variable, but also trade and FDI, could work as indicators on market-friendly policies.  
                                              
11 SME is defined as an enterprise employing fewer than 250 people. 
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Industrial structure, resource endowment, human capital, market access and political and 
institutional factors have emerged as important for regional growth in GRP per capita, but the 
evidence differs. Maurseth (2005) and Östreich-Nielsen (2005) find evidence that being close 
to large national markets or having large resource endowment is favourable for regional 
growth. Ahrend (2002, 2008) finds that initial industrial structure, endowment of natural 
resources and human capital had large impacts on economic growth performance during the 
1990s, but the importance decline significantly after the 1998-crisis. Also Dolinskaja (2002) 
derives a similar conclusion, with findings that confirm the importance of industrial structure 
and natural resources in explaining regional differences in growth rates. 
 
Empirical findings on the effect of reform-friendly policies, including the degree of price 
liberalization and privatization, on economic performance, are not unequivocal. Berkowitz 
and DeJong (2001) find that reform friendly politics exhibit positive correspondence with 
economic growth, Popov (2001) also find a positive association between reform politics and 
economic growth, but this effect is not significant when initial conditions as resource 
advantage and institutional strength are controlled for. Ahrend (2002, 2008) finds that 
political variables and economic reforms do not explain the variation in economic 
performance among Russian regions before 1998. However in contrast to what expected, 
especially with a view on the centralization of Russia under Putin’s presidency, in post-crisis 
Russia reform-oriented policies and better regional leadership are found more important in 
explaining regional differences in economic performance (see Ahrend 2008). 
 
A list of the included variables and a description of how they are constructed are attached in 
appendix 5.2.  Some variables require extra attention as to their construction and quality as 
indicators. I will go through them below. Issues more directly related to the quality of the data 
will be discussed in a separate section (5.3). 
  
 
The variables under closer consideration 
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The market potential for a firm is not restricted by the size of the economy of the region in 
question, but depends also on the size of the markets in surrounding regions. A firm in one 
region are serving markets in other regions, but the market potential for each firm is assumed 
declining with distance, due to the presumed increase in trade costs. To measure region i’s 
market potential I take the sum of the gross regional product (GRP) of all the regions, 
including regions i’s GRP, and weight by the distance to region i. The distances between the 
regions are calculated by taking the great circle distances between the capitals.12 There is one 
important weakness in my calculations; foreign markets are not included. This probably gives 
the variable an eastward and inward (domestic) bias. The variable does not include the 
possible positive effects of being close to large foreign markets. The result is an 
underestimation of the effect of being located in central federal district or as well at the border 
to other Asian markets in the east. 
 
To capture the possible effect of inter-regional spillovers within Russia I have constructed an 
indicator (spillover) of technological transfer, similar to the market access variable, using the 
other regions’ productivity level instead of GRP. This indicator is based on the assumption of 
increased geographical proximity for the channels for technological spillovers in general, as 
inter-regional trade and investments. 
 
Included in the recourse variable is the regional share of fuel, timber, woodworking and the 
pulp- and paper and metal industry in production. Depending on the quality of the national 
and regional institution, the resource variable is expected to have positive or negative impact 
on growth.  Empirical findings show that economies with an abundance of natural resources 
tend to grow more slowly than those without (Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997 a,b, Auty 2001). 
One argument is that the large resource rents spur a kind of rent-seeking behaviour among 
entrepreneurs and politicians, and that the resource sector over time could suppress other 
productive sectors. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2002) argue whether this is the outcome 
depends on the quality of the institutions that govern the economy. Such concerns have been 
voiced about the oil and gas sector, but I maintain that the argument applies to all sectors that 
                                              
12 For a formal description of the mp variable see appendix (A.5: Market potential). 
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are based on highly valuable natural resources with opportunities for easy gains. Even though 
the oil and gas industry is responsible for much of the revenues generated in the Russian 
economy, for some regions other sectors and resources, such as metals, diamonds and forest 
products, are a substantial source of revenue. The large fortunes from these commodities are a 
determining factor for a number of resource regions (Bradshaw 2006). 
 
My list of control variables is far from comprehensive. Political, cultural and institutional 
differences are especially hard to capture. In addition I have not been able to create a variable 
that captures the effect of being close to foreign markets. It could be argued that all these 
features change slowly over time, or at least the relative pattern between the regions remains 
approximately the same in time. Fixed-effect panel regression could therefore possibly 
control for these effects. I will therefore carry out a panel analysis to check the robustness of 
the convergence analysis.  
 
Panel regression  
A fixed-effect panel regression is intended to control for all factors that vary across regions 
but remain fixed over time. By applying this method I test for a sort of conditional 
convergence. A negative sign on the convergence coefficient (b) implies convergence, 
conditional on all factors determining the different regional steady-states. 
 
 I will do a ‘before and after’ analysis, which is a type of fixed-effect regression with two time 
observations (Stock and Watson 2003). By dividing the dataset into two equal time periods 
(1996–2000 and 2000–2004), I get two equal equations for convergence (5.3), one for each 
sub-period   ( 2,1 ). Initial productivity for the first and second periods is measured in 
1996 and 2000 respectively, and the growth rates are the four-year average for each period.  
By subtracting the equation for period 1 from period 2, I get a difference equation (5.4) that 
expresses the change in average growth as a function of the change in productivity level. 
 
5.3.     ,,, ln i
j
ijjii Xcindbag     2,1  
5.4.    1,2,969912 lnln iicindcindbagag    
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By focusing on changes over time I have removed the factors that differ over regions, but are 
fixed over time. Theoretically this implies that I control for all regional characteristics 
determining steady-states, since these factors are assumed to remain fixed over time. 
 
5.3 Econometric issues  
The analysis is based on regional data from Rosstat, which issues the official statistics in 
Russia, for the period 1996–2004. This gives me a balanced panel with 8 yearly and 79 
regional observations for growth and productivity level.  
 
Some weaknesses of the data 
Although technically correct, the Russian data suffer from reporting problems. Price statistics 
are often regarded as unsure, and views have differed as to whether it is preferable to use the 
official price statistics on deflation or not. I have regional price statistics for the whole period, 
which enables me to adjust for regional price differences over time. Despite their weaknesses, 
the regional price statistics for the industry are the best price indicator available and I will use 
them in deflation of the data.  
 
Another potentially significant source of bias is the under-reporting of value added in the 
industry sector. Much of the value added generated in industry is reflected not in the accounts 
on the relevant industrial sector, but in the accounts of affiliated trading companies. The 
problem is that this practice applies to certain sectors more than others – resource and the 
export sector in particular, which could have consequences for the observed regional 
distribution of productivity levels. According to World Bank estimates, value added from oil 
and gas production in GDP was under-represented by 11.4% in the official statistics in 2000 
(World Bank 2004). Since I do not have an indicator on this bias except for 2000, I am not 
able to control for this bias. 
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The observations on FDI are rather doubtful. A substantial part of the FDIs are actually 
Russian investments that have been on a ‘round trip’, and are not real foreign investments. 
The result is that the FDI variable also partly reflects Russian investments. 
 
Missing values 
In general there are not many missing values, but some regions and variables stand out. For 
the regions Chechnya, Chukotka autonomous okrug and Ingush republic, some observations 
are missing. Several observations are missing for the industrial employment and structure 
variables. With Chechnya, observations are lacking on almost all variables, so I have chosen 
to remove Chechnya from the sample. Moreover, the region has been destabilized for a long 
time, and in that sense represents an outlier. For the other republics and variables I have 
enough information to extrapolate the missing observations. A description of which 
observations have been extrapolated and how is found in appendix (A.5. Correlation table). 
 
Distribution of the data  
Figure 5.1. gives a picture of the distribution of average growth rates, conditional on initial 
productivity (1996). Most observations appear clustered around a slightly downward sloping 
line, but three observations stand out. The observation in the upper left corner represents the 
Ingush republic; the point furthest to the right is the oil- and gas-rich region of Tyumen incl. 
Khanty-Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets, while the observation second to the right is Sakha 
(Yakutia) republic, a region with considerable metal and mineral resources. Especially the 
Ingush republic can be regarded as a potential outlier – an assumption supported by the large 
annual fluctuation in the observations for that region. Tyumen incl. Khanty-Mansijsk & 
Yamalo-Nenets and Sakha (Yakutia) republic have by far the most resource-intensive 
production.  
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Figure 5.1: Average growth 1997–2004 versus productivity level in 1996.              
Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
 
Since the OLS estimators are sensitive to outliers I will control for the three outlier regions in 
the analysis by using regional dummies. In the multiple regression analysis, testing for 
conditional convergence, I will drop the observation on the Ingush republic and assume that 
the resource variable accounts for much of the effect from Tyumen incl. Khanty-Mansijsk & 
Yamalo-Nenets and Sakha (Yakutia) republic.  
 
Correlation between the variables 
In general, correlation between the explanatory or control variables is not a problem and the 
results in the analysis are still valid, but when the correlation is high it results in less precise 
estimates and the test statistics become less reliable. Population growth and migration as a 
share of the regional population are highly correlated (0.9296), not surprisingly since 
migration constitute an important part of the population growth in some regions. Market 
potential, spillover and migration are substantially correlated (corr≥2/3) and R&D is 
substantial correlated with market potential, education, as well as migration. The resource 
variable is highly correlated with initial productivity. A correlation table is presented in 
appendix 4.4.   
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The financial crisis  
Several studies stress that the years following the crisis, including the regime shift in 2000 
represents a shift in the Russian economy, changing the importance of the underlying forces 
in the economy (see for example Maurseth 2005, Nielsen 2005 and Ahrend 2008). Because of 
the short time period, and the large fluctuation in the growth rates also in the years after the 
financial crisis, I have not put any focus on dividing my regression into several periods.   
 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
From my descriptive analysis I found that the largest resource-rich regions were by no means 
the most productive, whether in 1996 or in 2004. I also found that the productivity ranking 
was quite stable, especially at the bottom. The five least productive regions in 1996 were the 
same in 2004. Even though the ranking has remained quite stable, the productivity differences 
between regions could have decreased. Whether the regional productivity rates have 
converged or diverged from 1996 to 2004, and dependent on which factors, is what I will try 
to answer next.  
 
Absolute convergence  
The test for absolute convergence supports neither convergence nor divergence among 
Russian regions. The convergence coefficient, b, has in general a slightly negative sign, but is 
definitely insignificant. When controlling for potential outliers, the effects of initial 
productivity on growth disappear.  
 
The results are presented in Tab.5.1. The first row shows the basic regression, reg1, on a full 
sample without any regional dummies. In regression 2, reg2, I have included a dummy for the 
Ingush republic (d_Ingush), a potential outlier. I have also tested the effect of including 
dummies for additional two potential outliers, the resource regions Tyumen incl. Khanty-
Mansijsk & Yamalo-Nenets (d_Tyumen) and Sakha (Yakutia) republic (d_Sakha), in the 
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regression. These results are found in appendix (A.5.Empirical results). In regression 3, reg3, 
I have removed the Ingush republic from the sample. In the final regression (reg4) I have 
tested the hypothesis of convergence on the 2/3 initially richest regions. 
 
The convergence coefficient, b, is slightly negative, but not significant in either of the 
regressions. Controlling for potential outliers further reduces the significance of the b. Only 
the dummy for the Ingush republic (d_Ingush) is significant, while the two other regional 
dummies do not show any significant effects on the result. Including a dummy for Ingush 
republic (d_Ingush) increases the explanatory power considerable. This large increase, 
because of controlling for one observation, is disturbing, and provides a strong argument for 
removing Ingush republic from the sample. When the observations for Ingush republic are 
removed from the sample R-square drops. 
 
  Absolute convergence 
  reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4 
Obs 79 79 78 78 
R-squared 0.1087 0.6433 0.0014 0.0013 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind –0.0467 0.2300 –0.0034 0.6860 –0.0034 0.684 –0.0043 0.7040 
constant 0.2340 0.0800 0.0853 0.0020 0.0853 0.002 0.0883 0.0320 
d_Ingush   0.5670 0.0000     
Table 5.1: Testing for absolute convergence. Source: Rosstat Regional Statistics 
 
Regression (regr4) shows results of testing the hypothesis on convergence on the 2/3 initially 
richest regions. The rationale for this is that the least productive regions could stand out when 
it comes to convergence. In the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) technology-gap model there 
could exist a threshold for where the gap between the least productive regions and the 
technology developed and advanced regions is too large. A possible outcome is then that the 
laggard regions are simply left behind. Regression 4 does not support the hypothesis of higher 
convergence among regions that were more similar in terms of initial productivity. I have also 
looked if there is any sign of convergence among the 1/3 least productive. The convergence 
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coefficient is significantly negative, but the sign of convergence disappears totally when the 
Ingush republic is controlled for. Results from this regression are presented in appendix A.5: 
Empirical results.  
 
There are in general no signs of either absolute convergence or divergence in my data.13 The 
OLS-estimator appears quite sensitive to the observation for the Ingush republic and the 
explanatory power increases disturbingly when a dummy for Ingush republic is included. I 
will continue to test for conditional convergence, as argued, without the Ingush republic in the 
sample.  
 
Conditional convergence 
My findings support in general the hypothesis of conditional convergence, although there is 
no sign of any strong convergence. There is no single factor alone which, when controlled for, 
leads to convergence in the results. When I include investments, including FDI, population 
growth or migration, in combination with resources and/or trade, the convergence result 
become significant. (See Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.)  
 
Only the regressions most important for explaining the fit of the theory and/or the pattern in 
data are included. Some other regressions are presented in appendix A.5.Empirical results. I 
have divided the regressions into two categories, according to which theory they are basically 
explaining. In Table 5.2 I have reported the regressions including the factors important in 
neoclassical convergence, while Table 5.3 includes variables important for the technological 
catch-up argument. Both tables include a variable controlling for regional resource 
production.  
 
                                              
13 I have also tested for absolute convergence for the sub-periods, 1996 –1998 and 1999–2004, but the results were not 
significantly different when the Ingush republic was removed from the sample. The results are attached in appendix (A.5: 
Empirical results). 
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When only the classical factors from the Solow-model and investment in human capital 
(education) are included, the sign on b is negative, but insignificant. Investments prove to be 
an important determinant for productivity growth. This is an expected result, especially since 
the Russian economy had been stagnating for many years prior to 1996 and, even though the 
economy was capital-intensive, the capital equipment used by the firms was not necessarily 
the most productive. It is reasonable to expect great potential in Russian firms for productivity 
growth through investments and adoption of already existing technology. 
 
Education is not significant in explaining the regional differences in productivity, even when 
potential omitted variables are controlled for. Population growth and migration have a 
negative coefficient as predicted by the Solow-model. Although the variables have high 
coefficients, the effects of the variables are quite uncertain, and their significance depend on 
that both variables are included.  
 
FDI is included in the ‘neoclassical-model’ table (5.2), because it constitutes a part of the 
total investment share in industry. The variable proves to be significant in most of the 
specifications. FDI is correlated with other ‘catch-up’ variables, such as R&D, SME, trade 
and ‘market potential’. According to the ‘catch-up’ literature FDI is a potential channel for 
technological transfer, but give such an interpretation of the effect from FDI is rather of 
ambiguous.  
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Neoclassical model 
 reg5 reg6 
Obs 78 78 
R-squared 0.1184 0.2251 
R-squared adj 0.0701 0.1713 
 Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind -0.0064 0.4920 -0.0265 0.0210 
constant 0.0265 0.5840 0.0827 0.0160 
Investments  0.1109 0.0170 0.0601 0.1430 
Population growth  -0.9423 0.2250 -0.3957 0.4540 
Human capital  0.0019 0.3020   
FDI   0.0021 0.0020 
Resources (res)   0.0007 0.0450 
   Table 5.2. The Neoclassical Model. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
 
When FDI is included together with resources, the convergence coefficient becomes 
significant at the 5% significance level, supporting convergence. Also when we include the 
combination FDI and trade, the convergence result becomes significant.  
 
Comparing regression reg6 (Tab. 5.2) and regression reg7 (Tab. 5.3) we see that including 
trade in the regression greatly increases the explanatory power of the model. Together with 
the regional investments, trade is the most robust variable, explaining a significant share of 
the variation in regional growth rates. No other factor stands out alone as so important for 
explaining the variation in the data.  
 
In regression reg8 I have included a set of variables, which could be important for catching-
up through technological transfer. Trade and FDI are still significant. Migration is the only of 
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the new variables with significant effect, but the coefficient is quite low. Neither spillover, 
R&D or SME has significant effect. When replacing spillover with the variable on ‘market 
potential’ in the regression, SME becomes significant (reg9), but the coefficient on SME is 
also quite low. Neither SME nor migration can be considered as very robust, since their 
significance is sensitive for the combination of variables included in the regression. The low 
significance of the R&D variable is not surprising, given that the Russian R&D-sector is 
considered to be highly unproductive and that few innovations have commercial potential 
(Gianella and Tompson 2007). 
 
The technology gap model 
  R7 R8 R9 
Obs 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.3335 0.4231 0.3345 
R-squared adj 0.2772 0.3467 0.2680 
              
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficien
t 
P>|t| 
lncind -0.0298 0.015 -0.0249 0.049 -0.0249 0.0660 
constant 0.0829 0.0000 0.091 0.013 0.1090 0.0030 
investment  0.0776 0.039 0.0868 0.0030 0.0822 0.0530 
population growth -0.9031 0.1370         
FDI 0.0015 0.0180 0.0016 0.0210 0.0017 0.0060 
trade 0.0829 0.0000 0.0729 0.0000 0.0858 0.0000 
Migration     -0.0009 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0000 
SME     0.0002 0.1640 0.0004 0.0000 
R&D     0.2990 0.1220   
spillover     0.0010 0.1340     
market potential         0.0000 0.0380 
resourses 0.0015 0.018 0.0004 0.2800 0.0002 0.5950 
Table 5.3. The technology-gap model. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
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The analysis does not support Krugman’s hypothesis of divergence and economic 
agglomeration. The convergence coefficient has in general a negative sign, although it is not 
significant in all regressions. The variable reflecting market potential proves to be significant 
in some occasions, but is sensitive for the model specification and is not robust. Migration, 
which should in the presence of economies of scale have a positive impact on growth rates, 
generally has a negative sign in the results. The hypothesis of higher growth in regions with 
large market potential has not been supported. 
 
I also tested whether initial industrial structure could explain some of the differences in 
growth rates over the period, but no single sector had any explanatory power, and the 
coefficient were all insignificant. The results from this regression are found in appendix A.5: 
Empirical results. Ahrend (2002, 2008) found that initial industrial structure, together with 
natural and human resource endowments are important in explaining regional growth 
performance14 before the 1998-crisis, but that initial factors, except resource endowments, are 
significant less important after. Neither of the industrial sectors, except resource intensive 
industries, is found significant in explaining regional differences in productivity growth in my 
analysis15, which accords with Ahrend’s results for the post-crisis period.  
 
The only structural variable that appears to have some explanatory power is the variable 
reflecting the regional share of resource intensive industry in production. Each of the defined 
resource sectors (fuel, metals and timber, woodworking and pulp-and-paper industry) shows 
no significant effect separately, but pooled together they get significant in explaining regional 
differences in productivity. The results do not support the ‘resource curse’ argument - the 
variable shows a positive coefficient. However, this result is not very robust and the 
significance of the resource variable depends on the variables included in the analysis.   
 
                                              
14 Ahrend (2002, 2008) used growth in GRP as an indicator on regional growth performance. 
15We both use the sector divisions supplied by Rosstat; the only difference is that I have merged a few of the sectors. 
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My results seem to support the hypothesis of conditional convergence predicted by the 
Solow-model and technology-gap model by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). In addition to 
initial productivity, of the control variables, investment and trade seem to be most important 
in explaining the observed differences in regional productivity growth rates. The result do not 
change substantially, when calculating the average growth rate following Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991,1992), which implies that the main conclusions of the analysis are not very 
sensitive for how the average growth rates are calculated.  
 
Comparing the cross-regional analysis with the panel regression 
The panel regression supports the result of conditional convergence. Caselli et al. (1996) 
among others have showed that using a panel analysis instead of a cross-regional tends to 
increase the estimate of the convergence coefficient. An omitted variable bias tends to 
underestimate the estimate on the convergence coefficient, but the fact that the analysis are 
more sensitive to business cycles could also cause an upward bias on the estimates. Since the 
time period is short, I will not focus on the magnitude of the coefficient, but rather use this 
regression as a check. The results from the panel regression support my general findings in 
the conditional convergence analysis. The result from the panel regression is shown in table 
5.4. 
 
Panel regression 
Regions Year 
Obs 
78 8 
R-squared 0.8173 
  Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.3697 0.0000
constant 0.0593 0.0000
  Table 5. 4. Panel Regression 
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5.5 Testing for σ-convergence 
Up to now I have focused on what is referred to as β-convergence, or convergence towards 
the mean. In general there is evidence that initially less productive regions have experienced 
greater growth from 1996 to 2004, conditional on factors like share of investments in 
production (national and foreign), openness for trade and large resource industry. However, at 
the same time, some regions have fallen behind, while other regions have had substantial 
growth. Analysing σ-convergence I find that the dispersion in labour productivity is largely 
varying over time. From figure.5.2. we see that the variance on log (labour productivity) does 
a large jump around 1997, possibly related to financial crisis. The large differences remain in 
the years after, until dropping around 2001. 
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Fig. 5.2. Sigma-convergence  Source: Rosstat, regional statistics. 
 
The years around the financial crisis were characterized by economic instability and a sharp 
decline in industrial production. In the years following the crisis industries recovered, and 
especially regions owing industries, which managed to utilize the opportunities after the 
finical crises, experienced large improvement in labour productivity. I can not rule out the 
risk that the conditional convergence pattern is influenced by a shift in the productivity 
ranking; that some initial less productive regions have by passed initial more productive 
regions. However, I will contend that my conclusions from analysing β-convergence remain. 
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Conclusion  
In this paper I have analysed the regional development of labour productivity in the Russian 
industry, defined as oil and gas extraction, electricity production, mining and quarrying and 
manufacturing, in the years 1996-2004. I have applied the hypothesis of absolute and 
conditional convergence and I have identified some regional specific variables important for 
productivity performance. 
 
My results do not support the hypothesis of absolute convergence, but the hypothesis of 
conditional convergence predicted by both the Solow-model and the technology-gap model 
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) is supported. Investment and trade, but also to large extent 
FDI stand out as the most important factors explaining differences in productivity growth. 
Assuming that trade and FDI are important channels for international technological spillovers, 
these findings could be explained, among others, by the technology-gap model. 
 
There is neither tendency for agglomeration among the Russian regions, nor any spatial 
association regarding productivity levels. Krugman’s hypothesis of economic agglomeration 
and diverging productivity levels is not supported by the analysis. While the most productive 
regions shows a clustering pattern around the resource-belt, the regions proving highest 
productivity growth during the period are scattered around the country.  
 
Differentiated industrial structure across regions has been emphasized as important when 
analysing regional convergence and is described as a potential barrier for technological 
transfer. Only the variable indicating the share of resource industry in industrial production 
prove significant in explaining regional differences in productivity growth. However, having 
a large resource industry seems not to be neither boosting nor hampering growth in the 
Russian regions. There is evidence that an extensive resource sector has a positive effect on 
regional productivity growth, but the results depend on other regional specific factors.  
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By analysing for σ-convergence I find that the dispersion in productivity level increased 
sharply right before the financial crisis in 1998 and remained high in the years after until it 
dropped around 2001. Even though my results seem not to be sensitive to including these 
years in my average growth estimates, I can not rule out that there has been a shift in the 
underlying forces working in the economy. Further research is needed to look into these 
issues in a longer time perspective, especially comparing the period before and after the 1998 
financial crisis and the subsequent economic instability.  
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A.4 
Labour productivity: Top5 
Regions 
Productivity 
1996 Regions 
Productivity 
2004 
Tyumen  216.080 Tyumen 337.339
Sakha (Yakutia) republic 125.463 Sakha (Yakutia) republic 153.299
Chukotka auton. okrug (10) 70.029 Komi republic (13) 113.205
Krasnoyarsk  60.391 Lipetsk oblast (14) 112.04
Vologda oblast (12) 55.122 Krasnoyarsk 111.536
Table A 4.1. Labour productivity: Top5 
 
Labour productivity: Bottom 5 
Regions Productivity 1996 Regions Productivity 2004 
Ingush republic 3.838 North Ossetia - Alania 11.417
Dagestan republic 8.639 Altai republic 12.626
North Ossetia - 
Alania 
9.770 Ingush republic 14.917
Adygeya republic 11.386 Dagestan republic 15.364
Altai republic 11.910 Adygeya republic 17.758
Table A 4.2 Labour productivity: Bottom 5  
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  
mean 
adjusted 
Std. Dev.16  Min Max Difference Median 
Lower 
quartile 
Upper 
quartile 
cind1996 31.838 26.758 34,419 8.639 216.080 207.441 19.249 25.601 38.143
cind1997 33.568 27.067 33,022 9.749 225.544 215.795 19.241 28.094 40.962
cind1998 33.255 30.995 38,170 9.219 258.688 249.469 18.609 25.959 38.393
cind1999 35.189 33.459 38,940 7.015 274.901 267.886 20.098 28.747 40.983
cind2000 44.940 43.658 39,785 7.759 354.716 346.957 24.092 36.506 49.855
cind2001 46.652 38.145 33,486 11.039 284.316 273.277 25.063 39.231 53.706
cind2002 44.540 34.814 32,011 11.323 275.350 264.027 24.257 39.052 51.270
cind2003 47.792 42.727 36,613 11.668 361.165 349.496 25.043 41.035 54.081
cind2004 50.807 43.115 34,753 11.417 337.339 325.922 26.006 40.503 56.960
Table A 4.3. Annual average labour productivity. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
                                              
16 Weighted by productivity average over the period as a fraction of the annual average. 
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Regional average 
productivity growth Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Differanse Median  
Lower 
quartile 
Upper 
quartile 
Average 1996-2004 0.0747 0.05  -0.028 0.231 0.259 0.065 0.044 0.105
 ag_ing17 0.083 0.091 -0.028 0.752 0.78 0.065  0.044  0.106 
g1997 0.068 0.171 -0.577 0.482 1.059 0.048 -0.019 0.168
g1998 0.017 0.377 -0.561 2.819 3.380 -0.060 -0.124 0.076
g1999 0.059 0.225 -0.601 0.841 1.442 0.047 -0.082 0.170
g2000 0.288 0.305 -0.094 2.015 2.109 0.224 0.093 0.369
g2001 0.097 0.205 -0.344 1.089 1.433 0.084 -0.032 0.208
g2002 -0.028 0.174 -0.580 0.494 1.074 -0.036 -0.099 0.086
g2003 0.089 0.252 -0.173 2.009 2.181 0.055 -0.022 0.139
g2004 0.062 0.170 -0.365 0.536 0.901 0.031 -0.058 0.175
Table A. 4.4.  Annual average growth 
 
Top10 Bottom10 
Region Avg. growth Region Avg. growth 
Ingush republic   0.1508 Omsk oblast   -0.0891
Sakhalin oblast   0.1288 Evrei autonomous oblast   -0.0357
Arkhangelsk incl. Nenets   0.1223 Ulyanovsk oblast   -0.0153
Astrakhan oblast   0.1210 Orenburg oblast   -0.0082
Saint-Petersburg   0.1166 Kamchatka incl. Koryak    0.0017
Moscow oblast   0.1130 Volgograd oblast    0.0048
Lipetsk oblast    0.1115 Altai republic   0.0065
Komi republic    0.1108 Bashkortostan republic   0.0100
Magadan oblast    0.1060 Altai krai   0.0105
Kursk oblast    0.0797 Tuva republic   0.0109
Table A. 4.5. Top and Bottom 10 
 
 
 
                                              
17 ag_ing is the estimate on average productivity including Ingush republic. 
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A.5: 
Cross-regional analysis 
 
Table of control variables 
Code Variable name Description Comment Year 
ag Average growth 


2004
1997
,8
1
t
tii gag  i=regions, t=time 
gi,t is the 
regional 
yearly growth 
rates 
1997-
2004 
lncind Labour productivity Log value-added industrial production/number employed in industry  1996 
sinv Investments  Industrial investment/ value-added industrial production  1996 
n Population growth   1997 
prof Human capital  Number employed with bachelor degree or higher   2000 
sfdi FDI  FDI as a share of GRP: sfdii=fdii/GRPi US$ 1996 
strade 
Trade  Total trade as a share of GRP: stradei=(importi+exporti)i/GRPi 
US$ 1997 
totmig 
Migration Net number of migrants  Measured in 1000 1996 
smig 
Migration share Net number of migrants as a share of the regional population  1996 
wsme  SME 
Formation of SME weighted by the relative 
size of the regional economy: 
i
i
i smey
ywsme 

 
y : regional 
average GRP  
1996 
mp 
Market potential 


ij
i
j
j
i GRPd
GRP
mp ,1996
,1996
,1996
,1996
18  1996 
                                              
18 For a closer description see below. 
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res 
Resources 
resources=(fuel + metals 19 + timber, 
woodworking and pulp-and-paper 
industry)/ value-added industrial production 
 1997 
srd 
R&D number employed in R&D related activities/total number of employees  1996 
spillover Spillover 


ij j
j
i d
cind
spillover
,1996
,1996
,1996  
cindj is 
productivity 
in region j 
1996 
Table A.5.1: Variables used in the analysis. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
 
Industry sectors 
I use the classification given by Rosstat. The sectors marked with *are merged from the 
original classification. The variables are measures as share of value added in the industry 
sector in total. 
Code Industry sectors year 
el Electricity production 1997 
fuel Fuel industry 1997 
metal Metal extraction and production:  ferrous + non-ferrous metals* 1997 
petchem Chemical and petrochemical industry 1997 
machmet Machine-building and metal cutting industry 1997 
timbcell Timber, woodworking and pulp-and-paper industry 1997 
light Light industry 1997 
constcer Constructions materials + ceramic and porcelain production* 1997 
foodgrain Food processing + grain and animal food industry* 1997 
Table A.5.2: Industry sectors used in the analysis.  Source: Rosstat 
Market potential 
I will use a weighted sum of all Russian regions` GRP, including region i`s GRP, as an 
indicator on region i`s ‘market potential’ (mp). The weight are based on the other regions 
                                              
19 Metals incl. ferrous and non-ferrous metal production. 
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distance to region i, such that GRP in regions far away will have little influence. The formula 
for mpi  can be expressed as follows (A.5.1.): 
 
A.5.1. 


ij
i
j
j
i GRPd
GRP
mp ,1996
,1996
,1996
,1996  i  
 
The distance is calculated utilizing the regions latitude and longitude degrees (latd and latm) 
and minutes (latm and lonm). These can be converted into decimal degrees (lat and lon) by 
the following formulas: 
 
60
60
lonmlondlon
latmlatdlat


 
 
“lat” and “lon” are further converted into radians: 
 
180
180
90




lonY
latX
i
i
   i  
The variables Xi and Yi  are used as inputs in an arc distance computation, which generates 
the distance between the regional centres:  
 
 jijiji XXXXYYdist coscossinsincosarccos0.3959    ji   
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Missing values 
The price index for Chukotka 
The 1997 observation on the industrial price index for Chukotka autonomous okrug 
(Pind,chukotka)  is missing.. Since I will keep Chukotka autonomous okrug in my sample I will 
extrapolate a value for PInd,chukotka in 1997 (PInd,chukotka,1997). There are several ways to do this. 
Because of the large fluctuations in prices over time, observations on price indexes for later 
years do not necessarily reflect the price level in 1997. The industrial price index for 
Chukotka seem to follow the consume price index for Chucokta (CPIchukotka). By regression I 
found that the first lag of CPIchukotka best explains the variation in Pind,chukotka over the period 
1998-2004. Based on the coefficient from this regression (tab. A.5.3.) and the observations on 
CPIchucotka in 1996 I can calculate PInd,chukotka,1997 .   
 
1.lag Consum Price Chukotka 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 67,0101416 17,09074599 3,920844 0,011173
123,6 0,40066902 0,12984738 3,085692 0,027293
 
Table A.5.3.: Estimates Price Index Chukotka, source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
 
Using the numbers from the regression in tab.A.5.3. the calculation of PInd,chukotka,1997  can be 
expressed by equation A.5.2.: 
 
A.5.2.   1997chukotkaind,P  = 67,01 + 0,401* 1996chukotkacons,P  
 
Employment data 
Total employment in the industrial sector is calculated from the reported share of employment 
in the industry (oil and gas extraction, electricity production, mining and quarrying, and 
manufacturing industry) times the total regional employment. Observations for the industrial 
employment share are missing for 1996. They are not included in the statistics I have become 
from Rosstat. The time series includes the years 1995 to 2004 except 1996. To construct a 
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measure of industrial productivity I need a full time series of the employment in the industry.  
Since I have observations on the employment share in 1995 and 1997 I can replace the 
missing observation on 1996 by the average of 1995 and 1997 employment share. For 
Chukotka is also the observation on total employment in 1996 missing. I replace the missing 
1996 observation with data on total employment in Chukotka in 1997, adjusted for the 
regional average fall in employment from 1996 to 199720.  
 
Data on industrial structure  
Several observations are missing on the share of different industry sectors in.  How many 
observations, which are missing varies from sector to sector. The electric power industry, 
machine-building and metal cutting industry, timber, woodworking and the pulp-and-paper 
industry, building materials industry, the light industry and the food industry have none or 
almost non missing values, while the ceramic and porcelain industry has almost half of its 
values missing.  
  
The main reason that observations are missing for a sector is either that the sector do not excist or 
only constitute a marginal share of the region’s industrial production. The ceramic and porcelain sector 
are very small also on national level. Also the resource sectors, especially the fuel and metallurgy 
industry, have a significant amount of missing values. This is mainly because resource intensive 
production is largely concentrated in a few regions having large natural resource endowments. Since I 
am interested in the effect of regional specialization, missing values for sectors, which in general only 
constitute a small share of the total regional production, are not critical, even though the amount of 
missing values is significant for certain sectors. To control for initial industrial structure I use 
observations for 1997 when analysing growth in the second period. Since the industrial structure does 
not change significantly from 1997 to 1998 I have replaced the missing values for 1997 observations 
from 1998, when they exist and zero for the rest. 
                                              
20 The average regional employment is approximately 20% higher in 1996 than in 1997. 
Correlation table 
  ag lncind sinv n education smig migration sfdi strade wsme mp spillover srd res 
                 
ag 1               
lncind -0.0371 1              
sinv 0.2604 0.006 1             
n -0.0861 -0.2559 0.2496 1            
prof 0.1269 -0.1936 0.1742 0.3816 1           
smig -0.0706 -0.3311 0.0312 0.9296 0.3081 1          
totmig -0.1001 -0.0133 0.0308 0.4544 0.5568 0.4414 1         
sfdi 0.3367 0.0732 0.1417 -0.1095 0.2274 -0.1384 0.2697 1        
strade 0.3663 0.2457 0.0845 0.1868 0.2837 0.1305 0.275 0.1907 1       
wsme 0.2417 -0.1184 -0.0617 0.0782 0.5092 0.1072 0.1243 0.0828 0.1604 1      
mp 0.066 0.3058 0.0453 0.3023 0.402 0.2779 0.7202 0.4093 0.3032 0.1296 1     
spillove
r 0.2081 -0.077 -0.1099 0.1984 0.4266 0.2652 0.5119 0.4461 0.2313 0.386 0.7665 1    
srd 0.0346 0.0774 -0.1417 0.2881 0.6546 0.2921 0.8197 0.3232 0.3001 0.3865 0.6754 0.5447 1   
res 0.1618 0.6535 0.2594 -0.2072 -0.3072 -0.3121 -0.2208 -0.0534 0.2811 -0.1957 0.0713 -0.169 -0.2403 1
A.5.4.: Correlation table. Source Rosstat, Regional Statistics.  
 
Empirical results 
Empirical results 
Testing for absolute convergence 
 
Including dummies for outliers 
Absolute convergence 
Obs 79 
R-squared 0.6433 
 Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind 0.0000 1.0000
constant 0.0747 0.0560
d_Ingush 0.5731 0.0000
d_Sakha -0.0410 0.0710
d_Tyumen -0.0048 0.8680
Table 5.5. Absolute Convergence. Source: Rosstat 
 
Testing for convergence among the 1/3 least productive 
 
  Absolute convergence bottom 1/3 
  with Ingush Ingush dropped 
Obs 79 78 
R-squared 0.4911 0.0033 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.22882 0.0440 0.0098 0.6990
constant 0.716862 0.0260 0.0496 0.4540
 
Table 5.6. Absolute Convergence bottom 1/3. Source Rosstat 
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Testing for absolute convergence in the two periods up to 1998 and after 
Absolute convergence 1996-1998 
  with Ingush Ingush dropped 
Obs 79 78 
R-squared 0.0996 0 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.1024 0.27 0.0001 0.994 
constant 0.3773 0.235 0.0251 0.703 
Absolute convergence 1999-2004 
R-squared 0.0104 0.0003 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind96 -0.0118 0.4580 0.0017 0.8670
constant 0.1336 0.0190 0.0847 0.0130
 
Table A..5 7. Absolute Convergence in 1996-1998 and 1998 – 2004.                                                               
Source Rosstat, Regional Statistics 
 
 Robustness test of my results 
 
Regression: data deflated by the regional 
consum price index (CPI) 
  with Ingush Ingush removed 
Obs 79 78 
R-squared 0.0100 0.0407 
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind -0.0130 0.6900 0.0220 0.0750
constant 0.1181 0.2850 -0.0018 0.9630
Table A. 5 8.  CPI Regression. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
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Testing for conditional convergence 
Testing the importance of differentiated industrial structure 
 
Industrial structure 
Obs: 78 A3 
R-squared 0.1857 
R-squared adj 0.0500 
      
  Coefficient P>|t| 
Lncind -0.0139 0.3700
Constant -0.0517 0.8790
sinv96 0.1123 0.0780
El 0.0015 0.6530
Fuel 0.0016 0.6330
Petchem 0.0014 0.6640
Machmet 0.0015 0.6370
Timbcell 0.0035 0.3270
Light 0.0016 0.6450
Metal 0.0017 0.5990
Constcer -0.0004 0.9090
Foodgrain 0.0015 0.6730
Table A.5.9. Industrial Structure. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
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Additional regressions on conditional convergence 
Conditional convergence 
Obs: 78 A1 A2 
R-squared 0.2182 0.3696 
R-squared adj 0.1639 0.3066   
          
  Coefficient P>|t|     
Lncind -0.0163 0.2330 -0.0273 0.0240 
Constant -0.0107 0.8120 0.1127 0.0020 
investment share 0.1414 0.0120 0.0610 0.0310 
population growth -4.2616 0.0050     
education (prof) 0.0032 0.0850     
migration share 3.0674 0.0160     
FDI     0.0018 0.0020 
Trade     0.0869 0.0000 
Migration     -0.0007 0.0000 
market potential     0.0000 0.0350 
Resourses 0.0007 0.0830 0.0003 0.5060 
Table A.5 10. Conditional Convergence. Source: Rosstat, Regional Statistics. 
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Robustness test: Using Barro’s and Sala-i-Martin’s growth rate 
I have here calculated the growth rate following the method used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991,1992). 
  BSM1 BSM2 BSM3 
Obs 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.0024 0.1069 0.2941 
R-squared adj    0.0580 0.2007 
              
  Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| 
lncind -0.0038 0.5980 -0.0063 0.4320 -0.0224 0.0480 
constant 0.0663 0.0050 0.0272 0.5120 0.0819 0.0120 
investment share    0.0953 0.0100 0.0710 0.0060 
population growth    -0.6685 0.2660    
education (prof)    0.0011 0.4760    
FDI/GRP        0.0013 0.0070 
trade/GRP        0.0302 0.0990 
Migration        -0.0007 0.0060 
SME        0.0002 0.1080 
share employed in R&D        0.2011 0.3070 
market potential        0.0000 0.0430 
resourses         0.0003 0.3800 
 
Table A. 5 11. Regression using Barro and Sala-i-Martin growth rate. Source: Rosstat, Regional 
Statistics. 
 
 
